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Responses to Technological Change

The Story of Diamond v.
Chakrabarty: Technological
Change and the Subject
Matter Boundaries of the
Patent System
Rebecca S. Eisenberg*
Technological change often exposes unstated assumptions lurking in
the law and makes them problematic, and patent law is no exception.
Although the core mission of the patent system is to promote technological progress, path-breaking new technologies have not always been easily
assimilated within its boundaries. The first wave of patent applications
on advances in biotechnology in the 1970s illustrate some of the difficulties. Before that time, living organisms had generally been assumed to
fall outside the range of patent-eligible subject matter under a timehonored exclusion for "products of nature." 1 But genetically engineered
organisms, although derived from naturally occurring life forms, seemed
to involve too much human intervention to be characterized as natural
products. Were they eligible for patent protection? Should the default
rule be protection or no protection? What are the roles of the courts, the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the legislature in figuring it
out?
The first stop for inventors seeking patent rights in new technologies, and thus the first institution to confront the legal issues that these
technologies raise, is the PTO. In the 1970s, as Ananda Chakrabarty's
patent application on a genetically modified, oil-eating bacterium worked
its way through the system, the PTO was confronting growing numbers
of patent applications in emerging "high technology" fields, notably
* Cc) 2005 Rebecca 8. Eisenberg. I am grateful to Rochelle Dreyfuss, Jane Ginsburg, and
Daniel Kevles for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1

See Funk Bros. Seed v. Kala Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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information technology and biotechnology, that strained the capacities of
its existing corps of examiners. Examination of patent applications in
new fields always presents special administrative challenges, including a
lack of examiners with the appropriate technical training and a lack of
readily accessible prior art in the form of previously issued patents. 2
These challenges were particularly daunting in the days before examiners had access to commercial databases of prior art or even to personal
computers. In this environment, the PTO had a strong institutional
incentive to exclude these fields categorically from patent eligibility
pending explicit legislation providing for their protection. Categorical
exclusions offer an efficient mechanism for filtering out patent applications at the threshold of the PTO, without the need for examiners to
delve into the underlying technology and to compare the claimed inventions to the prior art. If Congress thought that patent protection was
appropriate, it could address the resource needs of the PTO at the same
time that it considered what additional legislation was necessary for
these fields.
On its face, the Patent Act extends protection to "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter," without explicit subject matter exclusions. 3 But over the years the courts and
the PTO have sometimes seemed to endorse exclusions from patent
eligibility for certain categories of inventions, including architectural
designs/ medical and surgical techniques, 5 plants/ agricultural methods,7
2 See generally Bhaven N. Sampat, Examining Patent Examination: An Analysis of
Examiner and Applicant Generated Prior Art, NBER Working Papers (Aug. 2004 draft)
(concluding on basis of empirical examination of prior art references cited by examiners
and applicants that examiners are far better at identifying prior art in U.S. patents than
they are at searching non-patent prior art or foreign patents, and that examiners face
particular challenges in identifying prior art in emerging technological fields).
:i

35 U.S.C.

§

101.

1

See, e.g., Jacobs v. Baker, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 295 (1869) (suggesting that improvements
in the construction of jails were not patent-eligible subject matter, although also noting
that patents were properly invalidated for lack of novelty).
3 Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865)
(holding ineligible for patent protection method of performing surgery by applying ether to
render patient insensitive to pain); Ex parte Brinkerhoff, 24 Dec. Comm'n Pat. 349 (1883)
(holding that "the methods or modes of treatment of physicians of certain diseases are not
patentable."). But cf Smith & Nephew v. Ethicon, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNAl 1888, 1889 (D.
Ore. 1999) (claiming "a method of attaching tissue to bone by using a resilient suture
anchor which is pressed into a hole in the bone"); Catapano v. Wyeth Ayerst Pharmaceuticals, 88 F.Supp.2d 27, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (claiming a method of treating a human patient
to effect the remission of AIDS).
6 Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Comm'n Dec. 13 (1889) (holding ineligible for patent
protection a claim to "cellular tissues of the Pinus australis" tree separated from "the
silicious, resinous, and pulpy parts of the pine needles and subdivided into Jong, pliant
filaments adapted to be spun and woven"). But cf'. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (holding plants eligible for patent protection).

7 Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552 (9 th Cir. 1895) (invalidating patent on a process of fumigating
citrus trees in the absence of light).
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business methods,8 mathematical algorithms,9 and products and phenomena of nature. rn These exclusions have been viewed skeptically by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and by its
predece_ssor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), 11 and by
now most have been repudiated. 12 But thirty years ago the exclusions
appeared far more robust. They retained vitality, despite skepticism from
the CCPA, because they could claim authority from decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. t:l This divergence of views between the CCPA on one
hand, and the PTO and Supreme Court on the other, set the stage for
repeated rejections, appeals, reversals, and further appeals, generating a
confusing and inconsistent body of caselaw. 14

8 Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding
invalid a patent on a "method for cash-registering and account-checking designed to
prevent frauds by waiters" while noting that "a system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system is not ... an art."). But cf State St. Bank &
Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting business
method exception and stating that basis for Hotel Security decision was lack of novelty
rather than lack of patent-eligible subject matter).

!I

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).

111

Funk Bros. Seed v. Kala lnoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).

11 Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, consolidating
intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent law matters in a single court that would
hear appeals from decisions of the PTO and decisions of the Federal District Courts in
patent cases. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. An
important goal was to bring about greater uniformity and consistency in interpretations of
the patent laws.

12 E.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); AT & T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172
F.3d 1352 (Fed.Cir.1999); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'! v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'!, 534 U.S. 124, 130
(2001).
i:i See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed v. Kala Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).

14 See, e.g., In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (reversing PTO rejection of
claims to a computer-implemented method of converting numbers expressed in binary
coded decimal to pure binary form), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (reversing PTO rejection of claims to
a "machine system for automatic record-keeping of bank checks and deposits"), reu'd sub
nom., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
(reversing PTO rejection of claims to a method of updating alarm limits in a catalytic
conversion process through use of a novel mathematical formula), rev'd sub nom. Parker v.
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Supreme Court review has long been something of a wild card in
patent law adjudication. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has ultimate
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases in the federal courts, patent law
consumes relatively little of the Supreme Court's attention, whereas it is
a central concern of the PTO and its reviewing court (the Federal Circuit
today and the CCPA at the time of the Chakrabarty decision). Aggrieved
litigants, including the PTO, have often sought Supreme Court review of
Federal Circuit (and CCPA) decisions, and occasionally have persuaded
the Court to reverse. But the Supreme Court's sporadic interventions in
the field have sometimes seemed like rules laid down by a noncustodial
parent during weekend visits with the kids-at best, sparingly enforced
once everyday life resumes under the supervision of someone whose
judgment differs.
A leading voice on the intermediate appellate court for limiting
categorical exclusions and for making patent protection available to
inventions in all fields was that of Judge Giles Rich, who served first on
the CCPA and then on the Federal Circuit for a total of 43 years. 15 As he
sometimes noted in his opinions and other writings, Iii Judge Rich played
a major role in drafting the Patent Act of 1952 prior to his appointment
to the bench in 1956. Judge Rich believed that the 1952 Act had
overturned restrictions on the availability of patent protection set forth
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A.1977) (reversing PTO
rejection of claims to a biologically pure culture of a microorganism), uacated and
remanded for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook sub nom. Parker v. Bergy,
438 U.S. 902 (1978), on remand, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (again reversing rejection of
claims), uacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as moot sub 110m. Diamond u.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(reversing decision of PTO to reject claims to a bacterium that had been genetically
engineered to degrade multiple components of crude oil), cert. dismissed sub nom. Banner
v. Chakrabarty, 439 U.S. 801 (1978), on rehearing, In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.
1979) (again reversing rejection of claims), aff'd, 44 7 U.S. 303 (1980); In re Diehr, 602 F.2d
982 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (reversing PTO rejection of claims to method of curing synthetic
rubber which includes use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer),
aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
15 See Paul R. Michel, Recollections of Judge Giles S. Rich, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3
(1999),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol14/Michel/html/
reader.html.

16 E.g., Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J. concurring)
("I write in order to express some additional thoughts respecting 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) as a
member of the group which drafted that section .... In my view, considering what I know
to have been the intent of[§ 102(g) of the Patent ActJ, it has been thoroughly misapplied
by the board and the dissent here ... "). See generally Giles S. Rich, Congressional IntentOr, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in SouTHWESTERN LEGAL FouNDATION, PATENT
PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 61, 78 (1963) (quoting a
member of Congress who said that Rich and the other drafters of the statute, "far more
than any member of the House or Senate, knew and understood what was intended by the
language used.").
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in prior Supreme Court decisions, making the analysis and even the
vocabulary of the older cases obsolete and irrelevant. 17
A leading voice on the Supreme Court for restricting patent eligibility, both before and after passage of the 1952 Act, was that of Justice
William 0. Douglas, who, before his retirement in 1975, served almost as
long on the Supreme Court as Judge Rich served on the intermediate
appellate courts. 18 To Justice Douglas, the patent system was a limited
exception to an overall preference, on the part of both Congress 19 and the
framers of the Constitution, 20 for free competition in the U.S. economy.
He believed that patent rights had to be administered parsimoniously to
avoid extending monopolies beyond what Congress intended and the
Constitution permits. 21 Justice Douglas therefore set high standards for
getting a patent and endorsed broad exclusions from patent protection
for fundamental building blocks of science and technology such as
phenomena of nature 22 and mathematical formulae. 23 Although Justice
Douglas was no longer on the Court when it decided Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, his prior decisions in patent cases remained influential.
Against the backdrop of these competing judicial currents, science
and technology moved forward, bringing new technologies before the
PTO.
17 E.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (noting that pre-1952 cases used
the terms "inventions," "inventive," and "invent" to convey meanings which the terms no
longer have in the revised statute). A notable example of a vocabulary change brought
about by the Patent Act of 1952 is the reframing of the Supreme Court's requirement,
drawn from the language of the U.S. Constitution, that a patent could only be issued for an
"invention," into the statutory requirement, set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 103, that in order to
be patentable a claimed invention must be "nonobvious." Cf Graham v. John Deere, 383
U.S. 1 ( 1966) (noting that the limitation of patent protection to "inventions" is required by
the Constitution, that the Court interprets the statutory standard of "nonobviousness" to
be consistent with the Constitutional limitation, and that if Congress were in fact to
diminish the standard for protection below that required by the Constitution, the Court
would be compelled to hold the statute invalid).
18 Justice Douglas was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1939 and retired in 1975, for
a total term of 36 1/2 years. Oyez U.S. Supreme Court Multimedia, William 0. Douglas,
http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legaLentity/79/ (last visited Jul. 25, 2005).
19 Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470,495 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Congress
in the patent laws decided that where no patent existed, free competition should prevail. ... ").
2o A & P Tea v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("The Congress does not have free rein ... to decide that patents should be easily or freely
given .... The Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted.").

21

Id.

22

Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).

2:i

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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Chakrabarty's Invention
Ananda Chakrabarty is a Distinguished Professor of Microbiology
and Immunology at the University of Illinois who has accumulated a
long list of scientific publications over a career spanning four decades. 24
But in legal circles, he is better known as the patent applicant who
litigated the issue of the patentability of living organisms in the landmark Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 25
After completing his Ph.D. at the University of Calcutta in 1965,
Chakrabarty went to the University of Illinois at Urbana as a postdoctoral associate, where he studied the ability of Pseudomonas bacteria to
utilize a wide variety of organic compounds as nutrition. In the course of
this work, he discovered that the genes that allowed the bacteria to
digest compounds such as camphor and octane did not reside on the
bacterial chromosome, but rather on separate DNA elements called
plasmids that are more readily transmissible from one bacterium to
another. Chakrabarty's research demonstrated the potential of Pseudomonas bacteria to transfer between organisms plasmids containing the
genes that permit assimilation of these compounds, thereby enhancing
their nutritional versatility. 26
In 1971 Chakrabarty left the University of Illinois for a position in
the Research and Development Center of General Electric, where he was
assigned to work on the nutritionally frugal (if unappetizing) problem of
converting cow manure into cattle feed. 27 But he retained an interest in
basic research, and soon found a persuasive commercial justification for
continuing his prior research on Pseudomonas. In the early 1970s, in
some parts of the world, oil was cheap, but protein sources were
24 A list of Chakrabarty's scientific publications is posted at http://www.uic.edu/depts/
mcmi/faculty/chakrabarty.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
25 44 7 U.S. 303 (1980). This decision was the focus of extensive law review commentary. See, e.g., Peter B. Maggs, New Life for Patents: Chakrabarty and Rohm & Haas Co.,
1980 SuP. CT. REV. 57 (1980); Note, The Patentability of Living Matter: Hey Waiter, What's
Chakrabarty's Pseudomonas Bacterium Doing Back in the Supreme Court's Soup?, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 183 (1980); Note, Live, Human-made Bacteria As Patentable Subject
Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 1980 BYU L. REv 705 (1980);
Note, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Living Things as Statutory Subject Matter, l N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 119 (1980); Note, Patentability of Living Microorganisms: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 94
HARV L. REv.261 (1980); Note, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Oil Eaters: Alive and Patentable, 8
PEPP L. REV. 747 (1981); Note, Building a Better Bacterium: Genetic Engineering and the
Patent Law After Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 81 CowM. L. REV. 159 (1981).
26 Ananda M. Chakrabarty, Patenting of Life-Forms From a Concept to Reality, in D.
MAGNUS ET AL, WHo OWNS LIFE' (2002). The definitive historical account of the Chakrabarty
case is Daniel J. Kevles, Ananda Chakrabarty wins a patent: Biotechnology, law, and
society, 1972-1980, 25 HIST STUD. IN THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 111 (1994).

27

Kevles, supra note 26, at 114.
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expensive. These relative values made it commercially attractive to
develop a process for converting crude oil to bacterial biomass (which
would ultimately provide nutrition higher up in the food chain). 28 It
occurred to Chakrabarty that Pseudomonas bacteria could be put to use
in this bioconversion task, since he knew they could derive nutrition
from various components of crude oil. But crude oil is a mixture of many
different hydrocarbons, of which known Pseudomonas strains could only
degrade a limited number. A mixed culture of strains could potentially
digest more components, but some strains inevitably dominated others
in mixed cultures, limiting the extent of degradation (and therefore
limiting the generation of biomass). Knowing from his prior work that
the genes for degrading the separate components were borne on plasmids
that could be transferred from one bacterium to another, Chakrabarty
hit upon the idea of constructing a single Pseudomonas strain with
multiple plasmids. He worked on the problem after-hours and on weekends, and eventually succeeded. 29 While his research proceeded, the price
of crude oil rose substantially in world markets, calling into question the
value of the strain as a means of converting petroleum to biomass. But
his colleagues at GE decided that an oil-eating bacterium might nonetheless be useful for another purpose-cleaning up oil spills-and on June 7,
1972, GE filed a patent application on Charkrabarty's invention.3<1

The PTO's Response
Patents on technologies involving the use of microorganisms were by
this point familiar subject matter for the patent system. The pharmaceutical industry had been securing patents on methods of producing
antibiotics from microbial strains for decades, 31 and patents on microbial
processes for waste treatment were older still. 32 What made Chakrabarty's application unusual was that he claimed not only methods of using
his bacterial strains, but also the bacteria themselves.
The patent examiner allowed Chakrabarty's process claims, but
rejected the product claims to the bacteria on two grounds: (1) that the
claimed microorganisms are "products of nature"; and (2) that as "live
organisms" they are not eligible for patent protection. 3:1 Chakrabarty
28

Chakrabarty, supra note 26, at 18.

29 Id.
:10

at 19.

Id. at 19-20.

31

E.g., In re Maney, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (upholding patent claims to process
of making antibiotic by cultivating strain of bacteria).
:iz E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) (patent on
method of treating raw sewage).
:1:1

In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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appealed the rejection to the PTO Board of Appeals (the Board). The
Board set aside the examiner's holding that the bacteria were products
of nature, agreeing with Chakrabarty that his multi-plasmid Pseudomonas bacteria were not naturally occurring, but nonetheless affirmed the
rejection on the ground that living organisms may not be patented. 34
Meanwhile, in Ex parte Bergy, 35 a different Board panel applied a
similar analysis to an appeal from a rejection of a claim to a ''biologically
pure culture" of an antibiotic-producing microorganism. Bergy's organism had not been genetically altered, and thus might have been more
readily characterized as a "product of nature" than Chakrabarty's multiplasmid bacterium. (Indeed, the sole basis for the examiner's rejection of
Bergy's claim was that it constituted an unpatentable product of nature.)36 But the Board declined to consider whether the biologically pure
culture was a product of nature, and instead affirmed the rejection on
the different ground that it was living, and thus was not a patentable
"manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of§ 101
of the Patent Act. 37
In both cases, the Board thus set aside the "products of nature"
ground for rejections and focused instead on the fact that the claims
were drawn to living subject matter. In retrospect, this choice seems
both puzzling and fateful. Although patent applications on living organisms had been rejected in the past, 38 there was no precedent explicitly
stating that living things are ipso facto ineligible for patent protection.
Instead, the stated ground for exclusion had been that they were
unpatentable products of nature. Under the circumstances, one might
expect that the PTO would retain on appeal the tried-and true ground
for rejection rather than resting solely on an argument that the courts
had never considered.
To be sure, the products of nature argument was problematic in the
facts of both Chakrabarty and Bergy. A series of cases had previously
upheld patents on purified versions of products that exist in nature only
in an impure state, reasoning that the purified products were the result
of human intervention, and that in a purified state they were suitable for
purposes that the impure versions could not serve. 39 Similar arguments
34

571 F.2d at 42.

:i 5 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78 (U.S. P.T.O. Bd. App. & lnterf., 1976), rev'd sub nom. In re
Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).

36 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1032-33.
37 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 79-80; 563 F.2d at 1033.
38

E.g., Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Comm'n Dec. 13 (1889).

39 E.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (purified
adrenaline); Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken, 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220
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could be made for the organisms claimed by both Chakrabarty and
Bergy. But none of the "purified substances" cases had been affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the Supreme Court had seemed to endorse a more expansive
exclusion in its 1948 decision in Funk Brothers Seed Company v. Kala
Inoculant, 40 a case with notable similarities to Chakrabarty. The patent
at issue in that case claimed a mixed culture of naturally occurring
strains of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, useful as an inoculant to
permit plants to fix nitrogen from the environment. In the past, different
species of Rhizobium had been used to inoculate the roots of different
plants, but when multiple strains were combined, they had inhibited
each other's effectiveness. The inventor, Bond, identified strains that did
not have this mutually inhibitive effect and combined them in a single
product that could be used to inoculate multiple crops. The PTO issued
the patent and, in a subsequent infringement action, the Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of Bond's claim to the mixed culture,
characterizing it as a new composition of matter that contributed utility
and economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial inoculants. The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Douglas,
the Court elaborated upon the exclusion of the work of nature from
patent protection:
Bond does not create a state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the
bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are
of course not patentable. For patents cannot issue for the discovery
of the phenomena of nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the
heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws
of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to
a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention
from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law
of nature to a new and useful end. 41
Justice Douglas conceded that Bond had indeed applied his discovery of
the noninhibitive qualities of the bacterial strains to a new and useful
end by combining them into a new product-the mixed culture of his
claim. 12 He nonetheless concluded that the product was not patentable,
in language that sometimes suggested a categorical exclusion and someU.S. 622 (1911) (purified prostaglandins); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Corp., 253 F.2d
156 (4th Cir. 1958) (purified vitamin Bl2).
40

333 U.S. 127 (1948).

4 1 Id.

-12

at 130.

Id. at 131-32.
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times suggested a failure to meet the patent law standard for "invention":
But we think that that aggregation of species fell short of invention
within the meaning of the patent statutes. Discovery of the fact that
certain strains of each species of these bacteria can be mixed
without harmful effect to the properties of either is a discovery of
their qualities of non-inhibition. It is no more than the discovery of
some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable ....
[H]owever ingenious the discovery of the natural principle may have
been, the application of it is hardly more than an advance in the
packaging of the inoculants. . . . The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and
no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the
same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural
way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way their
natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided
and act quite independently of any effort of the patenteeY
One could, by analogy, have argued that Chakrabarty had also discovered some of the handiwork of nature-naturally occurring plasmids that
could be transferred from one microbial host to another, each permitting
its host to degrade a different component of crude oil-and combined
them in a single host organism. As Chakrabarty himself explained in a
1980 interview with People, "I simply shuffled genes, changing bacteria
that already existed." 44 In Chakrabarty's combination, as in Bond's, each
of the subunits (Chakrabarty's plasmids, Bond's species) continued to
perform in its natural way. If Chakrabarty's aggregation of multiple
selected plasmids in a single organism required more ingenuity than
Bond's aggregation of selected species in a mixed culture inoculant, this
distinction would seem to be a matter of nonobviousness, or "invention"
in the vernacular of pre-1952 Act decisions, rather than a matter of
patent eligibility.
The distinction between the threshold question of patent eligibility
and the more fine-grained question of patent-worthiness was easy to
miss in the pre-1952 cases, when the single term "invention" might be
used to describe what was lacking in both situations. 40 The 1952 Act
43

Id. at 131.

44

PEOPLE, July 14, 1980, at 38 (as cited in Kevles, supra note 26, at 116).

45 Compare Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, at
96 n.4 (1939) ("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be." (emphasis added)) with Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 149 (1950) ("Courts should scrutinize
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codified the requirement of "invention" in the latter sense and gave it a
new name, "nonobviousness," 46 but Funk v. Kala was decided before
that time and explained in language that left a lingering ambiguity about
whether Bond's invention was categorically ineligible for patent protection or was merely unworthy of patent protection because it was trivial.
This ambiguity may have made Funk v. Kala questionable as authority
for rejecting the claims of Chakrabarty and Bergy.
But Funk v. Kalo was not the last word from the Supreme Court on
this subject. Even after passage of the 1952 Act, in the years leading up
to its decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty the Supreme Court had relied
on Funk v. Kala in two more cases, each involving rejections of claims to
computer-implemented inventions. 47 Although the precedential value of a
case about a mixed culture of bacteria for resolving cases about computer-implemented inventions might not be not self-evident, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, not only cited Funk v. Kala with approval but
seemed to rely upon it:
Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work. As we stated in Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kala Co., "He who discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the
law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it
must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and
useful end." We dealt there with a "product" claim, while the
present case deals with a "process" claim. But we think the same
principle applies. 48
Categorical exclusions from patent eligibility for "products of nature"
thus retained considerable vitality in the Supreme Court in the 1970s,
making it all the more puzzling that the PTO would set aside this
ground for rejecting the Charkrabarty and Bergy claims while resting
combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of
finding invention in an assembly of old elements." (emphasis added)).
46

35 U.S.C.

§

103; Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).

47 In the first of these cases, Gottschalk u. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), a unanimous
Court overturned the CCPA and reinstated the PTO's rejection of a claim to a method of
converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals. The Court again
invoked the "products of nature" cases in its 6-3 decision in Parker v. Flook to overturn
the C.C.P.A. and reinstate the PTO's rejection of a claim to a computer-implemented
method for updating an alarm limit in the startup of a catalytic conversion plant. 437 U.S.
584 (1978). This 1978 decision had not yet come down when the PTO Board decided the
Chakrabarty and Bergy cases. See infra notes 72 to 79 and accompanying text. For a fuller
discussion of of Gottschalk v. Benson and and Parker v. Flook, see Maureen A. O'Rourke,
The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward Patenting Software, elsewhere in this Volume.

48

409 U.S. at 67-68 (citation omitted).
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solely on an unprecedented categorical exclusion for living things. It is
generally easier to persuade courts to adjust the boundaries of existing
legal categories to accommodate new facts than it is to persuade them to
create new categories.
Lacking explicit precedent for the principle that living things may
not be patented, the PTO was left to make a complex, and ultimately
unpersuasive, argument for an inference about Congressional intent (or
assumptions) concerning the patentability of living things from the fact
that Congress had passed special legislation to provide intellectual property protection for plants. The argument went as follows: Congress twice
acted to provide intellectual property rights in plants: first, in the Plant
Patent Act of 1930, which conferred patent rights in asexually reproduced plants; 49 and second, in the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,
which conferred more limited protection under the auspices of the
Department of Agriculture for sexually reproduced varieties. 50 Since
Congress went to the trouble of passing special legislation to provide
protection for plants, Congress must have believed that, absent such
legislation, plants would not be eligible for ordinary utility patent
protection under the general patent statute. Congress must therefore
have believed that plants did not fit within the existing patentable
subject matter categories of "manufacture" or "composition of matter."
The reason Congress thought that plants were excluded from those
statutory categories must have been that plants are living, and therefore
Congress must have believed that the statutory categories of patentable
subject matter excluded not only plants, but also all other living things.
From legislation that made it easier to get protection for plants, the PTO
thus drew an inference that Congress intended as a general rule to
exclude all living things from patent eligibility.
To recite this syllogism is to draw a roadmap for its rebuttal. The
relevant statutory language was, at the time, almost 200 years old, and
the actions of later Congresses is a questionable source for understanding the meaning of language used by an earlier Congress. Quite apart
from this difficulty, it is easy to come up with competing explanations
that are equally compelling. Perhaps, rather than believing that plants
were categorically excluded from the patent system on subject matter
grounds, Congress believed that plants could not satisfy the usual
standards for getting a patent (such as "invention"/nonobviousness and
written description) and wished to provide a source of protection that
avoided these obstacles. (Indeed, both the Plant Patent Act and the
Plant Variety Protection Act provided relief from some of the more
49

46 Stat. 376, codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161 et seq.

50

84 Stat. 1547, codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2402 et seq.
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stringent requirements of patent law for plants.) 51 Perhaps Congress
believed that plants were ineligible for patent protection not because
they were living, but because they were products of nature. Perhaps
Congress focused narrowly on the problems of plant breeders because
that was the issue before them, and gave no thought to the patenting of
other living things.
However narrowly Congress may have focused its attention in 1930
and in 1970, it is hardly possible that the PTO and the courts were
oblivious to public controversy over biotechnology as they contemplated
the issues before them in Chakrabarty and Bergy. The invention in the
early 1970s of recombinant DNA techniques, which permitted scientists
to create new organisms by splicing together genes from different
species, had provoked profound anxiety among scientists as well as the
general public.;;2 While most scientists soon concluded that initial worries
about the hazards of gene-splicing had been overstated, 53 popular interest and anxiety continued, taking on a new dimension with the advent of
commercial biotechnology in the latter half of the1970s. 51 Although
neither Chakrabarty nor Bergy had used recombinant DNA technology
in making their inventions, it was surely apparent to those considering
their cases that their decisions would have important implications for
future inventions in this controversial new field. 55
;;i See 35 U.S.C. § 162 ("No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance
with section 112 of this title [regarding description and disclosure] if the description is as
complete as is reasonably possible."). The Plant Variety Protection Act has no counterpart
to the nonobviousness requirement and has disclosure requirements that are easier to meet
than those for an ordinary utility patent. For a comparison of the two schemes, see Mark
D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury ... ?, 39 Rous. L.
REV. 727, 745-78 (2002).

52 Concerns within the scientific community led to a historic conference of molecular
biologists at the Asilomar conference center in Pacific Grove, California to discuss the
hazards associated with recombinant DNA research in early 1975. Much has been written
about these events. A useful synthesis may be found in Judith P. Swazey, James R.
Sorenson, & Cynthia B. Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of
the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 So. CAL L. REV 1019-78 (1978). For an
interesting retrospective on the controversy within the scientific community from the
perspective of the NIH Director at the time, see Donald S. Fredrickson, Asilomar and
Recombinant DNA: The End of the Beginning, in Institute of Medicine, BIOMEDICAL Pouncs
(1991 ). For a more critical perspective, see SHELDON KRrMsKY. GENETIC ALCHEMY THE SocIAL
HISTORY OF THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY (1982).

;;:; Kevles, supra note 26, at 121.
31

See MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY. THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 90-106, 132-75
(1986); DAVID DICKSON. THE NEW POLITICS OF SCIENCE 56-106 (1984).
55 Cf Kevles, supra note 26, at 121 (suggesting that "considerations of political
economy of biotechnology" did not figure in the PTO's analysis until after its decision had
been reversed by the C.C.P.A., when it had to decide whether to appeal to the Supreme
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Perhaps awareness of contemporary social discourse best accounts
for the PTO's focus on "living things" rather than "products of nature"
as the basis for rejecting the claims. In the rhetoric of the "products of
nature" cases, it was nature that had done the heavy lifting, creating
products and phenomena with awesome capabilities. The value-added of
human inventors was relatively trivial, consisting primarily of figuring
out what nature had done and then making minor adaptations without
really changing much. In the anxious rhetoric surrounding genetic
engineering in the 1970s, the relationship between nature and human
inventors was pictured quite differently. Human interventions in this
setting did not seem trivial, but profound and unsettling. Rather than
merely copying from nature, humans seemed to be altering nature's
plans in unprecedented (and, to some, alarming) ways. Neither proponents nor adversaries of the new technology saw it as the work of
nature. The concerns and intuitions that had persuaded previous courts
to leave natural products and natural phenomena as part of an unpatented "storehouse of knowledge ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to none" may thus have seemed inapposite in that particular
historical moment. 56
Even if the products of nature doctrine could serve to exclude the
relatively "low-tech" inventions of Chakrabarty and Bergy, it was unlikely to stretch far enough to exclude the results of "high-tech" genetic
engineering from the patent system. The essence of public anxiety about
genetic engineering was not that it was natural, but rather that it was
unnatural, that it amounted to audacious human tampering with life. An
argument for excluding living things from patent protection, although
lacking explicit support in precedent, may have resonated more closely
with this sentiment than the time-honored argument for excluding
products of nature.

The CCPA Reverses
Chakrabarty and Bergy each appealed the rejections of their claims
to the CCPA, which reversed in each case by a vote of 3-2. 57 Both
Court). But even prior to that time, as the PTO was deciding the Chakrabarty and Bergy
appeals in the first instance, PTO personnel were surely aware of extensive coverage of
controversy over recombinant DNA research in both the scientific press, e.g., Davis, Genetic
Engineering: How Great Is the Danger?, 186 SCIENCE 309 (1974); Erwin Chargaff, A Slap at
the Bishops of Asilomar, 190 SCIENCE 135 (1975), and the popular press, e.g., Horace F.
Judson, Fearful of Science: after Copernicus, after Darwin, after Freud comes molecular
biology. Is nothing sacred?, 250 HARPER'S 1498 (1975); Bennett & Guerin, Science That
Frightens Scientists, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1977, at 49.
56 Concerns about patents on natural phenomena impeding future scientific work
resurfaced much later in controversies over the patenting of DNA sequences as the Human
Genome Project got under way in the 1990s. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the Gene
Patenting Controversy Persists, 77 ACADEMIC MEDICINE 1381 (2002).
57

1978).

Jn re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.
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majority opinions were authored by Judge Rich, who took care to isolate
the issue for decision as narrowly as possible. He began each opinion by
stating that the PTO had not questioned that the inventions satisfied
the statutory criteria for patentability apart from the issue of statutory
subject matter. 58 He then reviewed the proceedings in the PTO, noting in
each case that, although the examiners had rejected the claimed inventions as "products of nature," the Board had affirmed instead on the
different ground that statutory subject matter does not extend to "living
subject matter." 59 Having thus pared each case down to the single issue
of whether living subject matter may be patented, he had little trouble
concluding that it could be. The Bergy case, although filed after Chakrabarty' s, was the first to reach the CCPA. The court therefore addressed
the issue at greater length in Bergy than in Chakrabarty, concluding in
Chakrabarty that the two cases raised exactly the same issue and
therefore the former decision controlled.
Judge Rich observed in Bergy that, although the PTO had only
addressed the single issue of whether living organisms are eligible for
patent protection, Bergy had also argued on appeal "the product of
nature question sidetracked by the Board." 6° Characterizing as "incontrovertible" Bergy's evidence that the biologically pure culture does not
occur in nature, Judge Rich surmised that "the board went in search of
another reason to support the rejection because it realized the examiner's position was untenable," and concluded: "The biologically pure
culture of claim 5 clearly does not exist in, is not found in, and is not a
product of 'nature.' " 61
Turning to the PTO's argument that living organisms are unpatentable, he began with the "clarifying observation" that "we are not
deciding whether living things in general, or, at most, whether any living
things other than microorganisms, are within § 101. These questions
must be decided on a case-by-case basis .... " He then considered a series
of decisions cited by the PTO in which the claims at issue had been
drawn to processes of using microorganisms, and the courts had suggest58 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1032 ("No references have been cited against claim 5
because the novelty and unobviousness of the biologically pure culture claimed are not
questioned. Neither has utility been questioned."); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 42 ("The
PTO ... has not questioned that appellant has invented and adequately disclosed strains of
bacteria ... which are new, useful, and unobvious.").
59

In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1033; In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 42.

60

563 F.2d at 1035.

61

Id.
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ed in dicta that the microorganisms themselves would not have been
patentable. 62 Turning the PTO's analysis of these cases on its head,
Judge Rich observed that "processes, one of the categories of patentable
subject matter specified in§ 101, are uniformly and consistently considered to be statutory subject matter notwithstanding the employment
therein of living organisms and their life processes." 63 It would be
"illogical," he concluded, to insist that "the existence of life in a
manufacture or composition of matter" renders such products unpatentable, while ''the functioning of a living organism and the utilization of its
life functions in processes does not affect their status under § 101."64 To
Judge Rich, Bergy's culture was "an industrial product used in an
industrial process-a useful or technological art if there ever was one." 65
Characterizing the organisms and their uses as "much more akin to
inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents, and catalysts than they are to horses and honeybees or raspberries and roses," he
concluded that the PTO's fears that their patenting would make "all
new, useful, and unobvious species of plants, animals, and insects
created by man patentable" was "far-fetched. " 66 Having thus resolved
that microorganisms are not categorically excluded from patent eligibility, he concluded that the rejection in Chakrabarty must also be reversed
when that case came before him five months later. 67
By this point the advent of commercial biotechnology had raised the
stakes of the controversy over patentability of microorganisms. The day
after the CCPA's decision in Chakrabarty, a front-page story in The
Washington Post reported that the decision "represents a potential gold
mine for corporations involved in genetic engineering research. " 68
Among scientists, anxiety about the hazards of genetic engineering had
begun to subside, leading the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to
relax previously imposed safety restrictions on use of the technology by
its grantees. 69 But controversy continued among the general public, with
62

Id. at 1035-37.

63

Id. at 1037.

64Id.
65 Id.

at 1038.

66 Id. at 1038-39. The two dissenters characterized Judge Rich's distinction between
microorganisms and other living things as "purely gratuitous and clearly erroneous,"
noting that the majority had failed to "advance any rationale for distinguishing between
different types of living things .... "
67

In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

68

Austin Scott, Court Rules GE Can Patent Life Created in Lab, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3,
1978, at Al. See also, Oil-Eating Bacterium Can Be Patented by G.E., Court Rules in 3-2
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1978, at A26.
69

43 F.R. 60080 (Dec. 22, 1978).
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some local governments considering their own restrictions on biotechnology research as federally-imposed restrictions were relaxed. 70
While the government pondered its options, the PTO was aware of
the precarious force of Judge Rich's decisions in the face of continuing
public controversy. 71 At the time, intermediate appellate jurisdiction over
patent matters was divided between the CCPA, which heard appeals
from decisions of the PTO, and the regional circuit courts of appeal,
which heard appeals from decisions of the federal district courts in
patent infringement cases. These other courts might not share Judge
Rich's picture of industrial biotechnology as merely an efficient way to
do chemistry, and might declare patents on life forms invalid when they
came before them for enforcement. The PTO ultimately urged the
Solicitor General to appeal the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court, figuring
that the issue would eventually be resolved by Congress. 72

Remand and Reconsideration
While the government's petitions for review in Bergy and Chakrabarty were pending, the Supreme Court reversed the CCP A in another
case involving patent eligibility, Parker v. Flook. 73 The invention in that
case was a computer-implemented method for updating alarm limits
during catalytic conversion processes through use of a novel mathematical formula. Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority took a strikingly
different approach to the issue of patent eligibility than that expressed
by Judge Rich. He began by noting that the Court's decision six years
earlier in Gottschalk v. Benson 74 was inconsistent with a literal interpretation of § 101 of the Patent Act, notwithstanding the apparently
unqualified language of the statute:
The plain language of 101 does not answer the question. It is true,
as respondent argues, that his method is a "process" in the ordinary
sense of the work. But that was also true of the algorithm ... that
was involved in Gottschalk v. Benson. The holding that the discovery
of that method could not be patented as a "process" forecloses a
purely literal reading of 101. 75
70 See Donald S. Fredrickson, The Recombinant DNA Controversy: A Memoir: Science,
Politics & the Public Interest 1974-1981 (2001), available at National Library of Medicine,
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/FFNiews/Exhibit/documents/rdna.

71

Kevles, supra note 26, at 122-123.

72/d.
73

437 U.S. 584 (1978).

74

409 U.S. 63 (1972).

75

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90.
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Echoing Justice Douglas's analogy between mathematical algorithms and
laws of nature in Gottschalk v. Benson, the majority concluded that the
Court's earlier decision in Funk v. Kalo indicated the proper analysis:
Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of
the claimed invention, as one of the "basic tools of scientific and
technological work," it is treated as though it were a familiar part of
the prior art . . . . 76
The Court rejected the argument that this approach confuses the determination of patent eligibility under § 101 with the determinations of
novelty and "inventiveness" under §§ 102 and 103. In language reminiscent of Justice Douglas's opinion in Funk v. Kalo, Justice Stevens
elaborated:
The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented
rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes,
but rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are
not the kind of "discoveries" that the statute was enacted to protect.
The obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be
patented must precede the determination of whether that discovery
is, in fact, new or obvious .... Respondent's process is unpatentable
under 101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one
component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within
the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no
patentable invention. 77
Yet there were signs that the Supreme Court was softening in its
approach to patent eligibility. The Court acknowledged that its reasoning
was "derived from opinions written before the modern business of
developing programs for computers was conceived," 78 and that its decision should not be interpreted "as reflecting a judgment that patent
protection of certain novel and useful computer programs will not
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or that such
protection is undesirable as a matter of policy." 79 Rather, the Court saw
the issue before it as raising "difficult questions of policy" that could
better be answered by Congress, and concluded that "we must proceed
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforeseen by Congress. " 80
76

Id. at 591-92.

77

Id. at 593-94.

78

Id. at 595.

79

Id.

80 Id. at 596, citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
Perhaps the most conspicuous harbinger of the Court's imminent liberalization of its
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A few days later, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the
CCPA in Bergy and remanded for reconsideration in light of Parker v.
Flook. 81 The CCPA granted the PTO's petition to vacate its own decision
in Chakrabarty and set the two cases for hearing together, asking the
parties to file supplementary briefs on the effect, "if any," of Parker v.
Flook on its prior decisions. 82
Judge Rich again wrote for the majority on reconsideration, again
reversing the rejections in both cases. He was conspicuously unimpressed
by the Flook decision and visibly irritated at the government for having
taken the cases up to the Supreme Court. He began with a back-to-basics
review of the anatomy of the patent statute, purportedly for the benefit
of the Supreme Court, which he felt had exposed some confusion about
the statute in its Flook opinion:
The reason for our consideration of the statutory scheme ... is that
. . . we find in Flook an unfortunate and apparently unconscious,
though clear, commingling of distinct statutory provisions which are
conceptually unrelated, namely, those pertaining to the categories of
inventions in § 101 which may be patentable and to the conditions
for patentability demanded by the statute for inventions within the
statutory categories, particularly the nonobviousness condition of
§ 103 .... The problem of accurate unambiguous expression is exacerbated by the fact that prior to the Patent Act of 1952 the words
"invention," "inventive," and "invent" had distinct legal implications related to the concept of patentability which they have not had
for the past quarter century. . . . Statements in the older cases must
be handled with care lest the terms used in their reasoning clash
with the reformed terminology of the present statute; lack of meticulous care may lead to distorted legal conclusions. 83
He offered an analogy to three doors that a patent applicant must open
and pass through in order to get a patent, corresponding to§§ 101, 102,
interpretation of § 101 was the fact that three justices dissented, taking the position that
the majority was confusing the issue of subject-matter patentability under § 101 with the
criteria of novelty and inventiveness under §§ 102 and 103. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at
598, 600 (Stewart, J. dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
8!

Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).

s2 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 956-58 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
83

Id. at 959. The unmistakable condescension toward the Supreme Court in Judge
Rich's opinion led amicus University of California to distance itself from the opinion of the
CCPA in its Supreme Court brief, even as it asked the Supreme Court to affirm the
decision, noting that the CCPA "tends toward legal error and has long waged war against
this Court's venerable and unvaried interpretations of the patent laws." Brief Amicus
Curiae of the University of California at 24 (filed Jan. 28, 1980) (Westlaw Supreme Court
Briefs file).
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and 103 of the Patent Act. To get through the first door, the invention
need not satisfy any "qualitative conditions," so long as it fits within the
"broad and general" categories of "any ... process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any ... improvement thereof." Judge
Rich's ellipses omitted the statutory language "new and useful," which
appears twice in§ 101. As he explained, "the invention is not examined
under that statute for novelty because that is not the statutory scheme
of things or the long-established administrative practice." Instead, the
invention, whether new or old, passes through the first door, to be
examined for novelty at the second door under the standards set forth in
§ 102. To reject a claim for lack of novelty under § 101 rather than
§ 102 "is confusing and therefore bad law." 84 In contrast to his tone of
gentle condescension toward the Supreme Court for confusing the issues
of patent-eligibility and patent-worthiness in Parker v. Flook, Judge Rich
excoriated the Solicitor General for having done the same thing in its
briefs, "badly and with a seeming sense of purpose. " 85
Turning to the assigned task on remand of determining what light
the Supreme Court's opinion in Parker v. Flook shed on the issue in
Bergy and Chakrabarty, Judge Rich concluded that the only thing the
three cases had in common is that they all involved § 101. He noted
that:

Flook was about the patentability of computer programs as "processes," not about the patentability of living subject matter as
"manufactures" or "compositions of matter." Nor did the Court's
review of "hornbook law" concerning the nonpatentability of "principles, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual concepts, ideas,
natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calculation,
fundamental truths, original causes, motives, the Pythagorean theorem, and ... computer-implementable method claims ... " have any
application to the Bergy and Chakrabarty appeals, which "do not
involve an attempt to patent any of these things. " 86
On two final points, Judge Rich was not content to simply distinguish Flook from the cases before him, but felt the need to set the
Supreme Court straight. First was the statement in Flook, relying on the
authority of Funk v. Kala, that a mathematical formula, like a law of
nature, must be deemed to be "a familiar part of the prior art"-"even
when it was not familiar, was not prior, was discovered by the applicant
84

Bergy at 961.

85

Id. Judge Rich characterized as "subversive nonsense" the Solicitor General's
argument that the opening phrase, "Whoever invents or discovers ... " continues in effect
the prior judicial standard of "invention" as a requirement of§ 101. Id. at 963.
86

Id. at 965.
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for patent, was novel at the time he discovered it, and was useful. " 87
Although insisting that "the foregoing novel principle has no applicability whatever" to the appeals before him, Judge Rich also warned that the
Supreme Court's approach "gives to the term 'prior art,' which is a very
important term of art in patent law, ... an entirely new dimension with
consequences of unforeseeable magnitude. " 88 Second was Justice Stevens's concluding observation, relying on the authority of Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 89 that the courts should proceed cautiously
when "asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress." 90 Peering behind the Flook opinion to the Deepsouth case,
Judge Rich thought that what had made it appropriate for the Court in
Deepsouth to await further guidance from Congress was that it was
asked to overturn a long line of prior decisions. By contrast, Judge Rich
observed that the Bergy and Chakrabarty cases raised an issue of first
impression, which the courts could resolve on their own without awaiting any signal from Congress. 91 He returned to this theme at the end of
the opinion, turning the charge of unauthorized lawmaking back on the
PTO:
Faced with the necessity of rendering a decision one way or the
other on whether these inventions are encompassed by § 101, there
being no prior decisions to guide us, we merely carry out our normal
judicial function in deciding to say yes rather than no .... Rather, it
seems to us, it is the PTO, not this court, that is attempting to
legislate. It may have reasons for not wanting to examine the
appealed claims for patentability under §§ 102 and 103, but if so, it
has not revealed them ... For whatever reason, it decided to reject,
first on one ground and then on another, and then set out, lawyerlike, to devise unduly exaggerated justifications spiced with bits and
pieces from wholly unrelated plant patent legislation from nearly
half a century ago .... "We should not read into the patent laws
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed. " 92
87 Id. at 965-66 ("This gives to the term 'prior art,' which is a very important term of
art in patent law, particularly in the application of§ 103, an entirely new dimension with
consequences of unforeseeable magnitude. . . . The potential for great harm to the incentives of the patent system is apparent.' ").
88

Id.

89

406 U.S. 518 (1972).

90

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978).

91

596 F.2d at 966-67.

92 Id. at 987-88 (quoting from U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199
(1933)).
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Judge Rich's opm10n on remand offered substantially the same
analysis as his original opinions for the CCPA in Bergy and Chakrabarty.
But the decision on remand picked up an additional vote from Judge
Baldwin, who had dissented the first time around in both cases. 93 He
wrote a separate concurring opinion disagreeing with Judge Rich's
conclusion that Parker v. Flook had no bearing on these appeals, and
then offered a painstaking analysis of Supreme Court precedents that
had excluded certain categories of subject matter from patent protection
notwithstanding that they fell within "the dictionary definitions of
process, manufacture or composition of matter:"
The common thread throughout these cases is that claims which
directly or indirectly preempt natural laws or phenomena are proscribed, whereas claims which merely utilize natural phenomena via
explicitly recited manufactures, compositions of matter or processes
to accomplish new and useful end results define statutory inventions.94
Because he concluded that the claims before the court "do not reach out
to encompass natural phenomena ... but rather recite only non-naturally occurring compositions of matter that are but single tools for utilizing
natural phenomena in producing new and useful end results," he voted
with the majority to reverse the rejections. 95 The sole remaining dissenter was Judge Miller, who chastised the majority for concentrating on
"literal statements" in Parker v. Flook while ignoring the thrust of the
Court's admonition to await a clear signal from Congress when there is a
basis for substantial doubt as to its intent. 96

Back to the Supreme Court
By this point the scientific and commercial significance of the
controversy over patenting life was manifest. As concerns about the
hazards of gene-splicing were subsiding among scientists, 97 researchers
had successfully used recombinant DNA technology to clone medically
93

596 F.2d 952, 988 (Baldwin, J. concurring).

94Id.

95 Id. at 997. Judge Baldwin also dismissed the argument that the decision would
inevitably lead to the patenting of higher life forms with the prediction that inventors
would find it too difficult to comply with the disclosure requirements of§ 112 of the Patent
Act for higher organisms. Id. at n.7.
96 596

F.2d 952, 999 (Miller, J., dissenting).

97 After

initially imposing stringent guidelines on the use of government funds in
recombinant DNA research, 41 Fed. Reg. 27902 (Jul. 7, 1976), the National Institutes of
Health relaxed the restrictions considerably 2 ¾ years later after preliminary experience
produced no evidence of illness or other harm. 43 Fed. Reg. 60080 (Dec. 22, 1978).
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important genes in microorganisms. 98 New companies were forming to
develop promising therapies out of these discoveries, raising capital from
investors who hoped to earn a return on their investments. 99 Both
private firms and universities engaged in biotechnology research looked
to patents as a means of capturing the value of the new technology, and
took note of the Chakrabarty and Bergy cases.
While the cases were before the CCPA on remand from the Supreme
Court, the University of California, the American Patent Law Association, and Genentech filed amicus briefs on behalf of the patent applicants.100 By the time the cases reached the Supreme Court again, these
amici were joined by the New York Patent Law Association, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the American Society for Microbiology, the American Society of Biological Chemists, the Association of
American Medical Colleges, the American Council on Education, and the
California Institute of Technology, as well as several eminent scientists,
all arguing in favor of patent protection. Indeed, according to historian
Daniel Kevles, by this point many people within the PTO favored patent
protection for living organisms, including the new Commissioner, Donald
Banner, who thought the CCPA decision was correct and was not
inclined to seek Supreme Court review. 101 Others within the PTO favored
taking the case to the Supreme Court in the hope of getting an affirmance that would give biotechnology investors greater assurance of the
validity of their patents, while the Solicitor General of the United States
favored reversal. 102 The government filed for certiorari in both cases, but
after the petition was granted, the patent applicant in Bergy voluntarily
canceled its claims to the purified microorganism, leading the Supreme
Court to remand with instructions to dismiss Bergy as moot. 10:i As a
consequence (indeed, perhaps by design), 104 the Supreme Court was left
98 See, e.g., K. Itakura et al., Expression in Escherichia coli of a chemically synthesized
gene for the hormone somatostatin; 198 ScIENCE 1056-63 (1977); D. Goeddel et al.,
Expression in Escherichia coli of chemically synthesized genes for human insulin, 76 PRoc
NATL AcAD. Sci 106-110 (1979); D. Goeddel et al., Direct expression in Escherichia coli of a
DNA sequence coding for human growth hormone, 281 NATURE 544-48 (1979).
99 See, e.g., R. Reinhold, There's Gold in Them Thar Recombinant Genetic Bits, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1980, sec. 4, p.8, col. 3; Where genetic engineering will change industry, Bus.
WK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 160.

100 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 957.
101 Kevles, supra note 26,
102 Id.

at 126.

at 123, 126-27.

103

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (vacating judgment in In re Bergy
and remanding with directions to dismiss as moot).
104 According to Professor Kevles, Bergy's lawyer believed that Chakrabarty had a
stronger case, and thought it more likely that the Supreme Court would uphold the
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to consider the patentability of life forms only in the more compelling
context of the human-modified organism claimed in Chakrabarty.
If the PTO Commissioner was an ambivalent petitioner before the
Supreme Court, the Petitioner's Brief did not betray it. 105 Characterizing
the question presented as whether a living organism is patentable
subject matter, the brief cited venerable Supreme Court precedent
requiring that "the patent laws . . . be strictly construed in light of the
basic national economic policy against monopoly, and in order to preserve to Congress decisions concerning extension of the patent laws into
new areas." 106 According to the petitioner, "it was generally assumed by
the legal profession, writers on the subject, and Congress" that living
organisms are not patentable, and Congress had acted on that assumption in passing the Plant Patent Act in1930 and the Plant Variety
Protection Act in 1970. 107 Congress, but not the courts, could adapt the
terms of protection to suit the attributes of living subject matter, as it
had done in those prior acts, and could decide what weight to attach to
perceptions of ethical problems and public health risks associated with
genetic engineering. 108 The brief made no mention of Funk v. Kala or the
products of nature doctrine.
Chakrabarty disputed that allowance of his claim would extend the
patent laws into new areas, 109 counting over sixty issued U.S. patents
claiming living subject matter and identifying official PTO classes and
subclasses to deal with such patentsY0 Highlighting a passage from the
legislative history of the Patent Act, Chakrabarty urged that a patentable manufacture "may include anything under the sun that is made by
man," 111 and went on to distinguish his engineered organism from the
relatively unchanged living materials that had been denied patent protection in past judicial decisions. He concluded that "[i]f the Government
patentability of living subject matter if the only case before it were Chakrabarty than if it
were deciding both cases together. Kevles, supra note 26, at 127.
105 See Brief for Petitioner on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (filed Jan. 4, 1980) (available from LexisNexis).
106 Id.,

text preceding note 9.

101

Id., text at note 9.

108

Id., text at notes 14-23.

109

See Brief for Respondent On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (filed Jan. 29, 1980) (available from
Lexis-Nexis).
110 Id.
111

text at notes 9-10.

Id. at note 22 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), p.6; S. Rep.
No. 1979 (1952), U.S. Code, Cong. and Admin. News, p. 2399).
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wishes to reverse its policy, it should address its desires to the Congress,
which can legislate an exclusion, if that is found to be required by the
public interest."
Chakrabarty's numerous amici, including elite scientists, universities, and scientific societies, explained to the Court the sophisticated
human intervention involved in the new biotechnology and argued that a
per se rule excluding living things from patentability would discourage
the commercial development of important scientific advances. 112 Some of
the briefs urged that a distinction between living and nonliving subject
matter was not only unprecedented as a matter of patent law, but
unworkable and meaningless from a scientific perspective. 113
Only one amicus curiae filed a brief in support of the government
opposing patent protection for living subject matter on the merits-the
Peoples Business Commission, a non-profit educational foundation
formed by genetic engineering critic Jeremy Rifkin. That brief paradoxically echoed the arguments in favor of patent protection for living
organisms, noting that such patents ''would significantly contribute to
the profit potential of the genetic industry, thus generating a greater
momentum in research and development of genetic engineering technologies" leading to a "rapid proliferation of genetic techniques ... in many
other aspects of the nation's economic life. "rn Reading these arguments
today, it takes some imagination to reconstruct the prevailing anxiety
about genetic engineering that would lead the authors to expect these
incentive effects to be counted as a reason to exclude living subject
matter from patent protection.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the CCPA by a 5-4 vote,
revealing a significant shift in the balance of views on the Court since
the 6-3 decision just two years earlier in Parker v. Flook. The Chakrabarty majority included Justice Stevens, who had authored the majority
ll 2 The arguments advanced in the briefs are summarized in Kevles, supra note 26 at
127-31.
113 See, e.g., Brief on Behalf of Dr. Leroy E. Hood, Dr. Thomas P. Maniatis, Dr. David
S. Eisenberg, The American Society Of Biological Chemists, The Association Of American
Medical Colleges, The California Institute of Technology, The American Council On
Education As Amici Curiae at 12 (filed Jan. 26, 1980) (Westlaw Supreme Court Briefs file)
("There is no distinct line between life and non-life. The prevailing view among scientists
is that the essential characteristic of 'living' subject matter is nothing more than its
complexity."); Brief of Dr. George Pieczenik as Amicus Curiae at 3 (filed Jan. 29, 1980)
(Westlaw Supreme Court Briefs file) ("The distinction between living and non-living
matter has no real meaning in relation to this technology. . . . To attempt to separate
patentable and unpatentable subject matter on the basis of such a concept is to invite
confusion in the art, to ignore existing law and to ignore scientific reality.").
114 Brief on Behalf of the People's Business Commission, Amicus Curiae at 3 (filed Dec.
13, 1979) (Westlaw Supreme Court Briefs file).
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opinion denying patent protection in Flook, and Justice Blackmun, who
had joined in that opinion, as well as the three Flook dissenters, Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Flook majority and Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the
Chakrabarty majority took strikingly different approaches to the proper
construction of section 101 of the Patent Act. Whereas the Flook
majority had insisted that the "plain language" of section 101 did not
answer the question of what kind of "discoveries" the statute was
enacted to protect, 115 the Chakrabarty majority rested heavily on the
plain language of the statute, proclaiming that "courts 'should not read
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has
not expressed.' " 116 The Flook majority had warned that "we must
proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas
wholly unforeseen by Congress." 117 Two years later, the Chakrabarty
majority balked at applying this principle to preclude patenting of living
subject matter, quipping that "[a] rule that unanticipated inventions are
without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law
that anticipation undermines patentability" and insisting that "Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable." 118 Both opinions acknowledged that it was up to Congress, and not the courts, to set the
boundaries of patent eligibility. But the Flook majority thought the PTO
and the courts should await further clarification from Congress before
allowing patent protection for computer-implemented inventions of the
sort at issue in that case, while the Chakrabarty majority, believing that
Congress had already broadly authorized patent protection for "anything
under the sun that is made by man," thought that until Congress saw fit
to amend the statute, "this Court must construe the language of§ 101
as it is. " 119
115

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588, 593.

116

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.

117 437
118

U.S. at 596.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315-16.

119 Jd. at 318. One could reconcile the two decisions as a formal matter on the ground
that in Chakrabarty the government was proposing a new limitation on patent eligibility
(an exclusion for living subject matter) that had never previously been articulated in the
case law, while in Flook it was relying upon a longstanding limitation (an exclusion for
mathematical algorithms) that was well established in prior cases. If one imagines that
Congress scrutinizes judicial opinions and enacts new legislation when it is unhappy with
the directions of the case law, perhaps it makes sense for the Court to await guidance from
Congress before creating a new judicial limitation (as it did in Chakrabarty), while
retaining in effect time-honored judicial limitations that Congress has had plenty of time to
correct (such as the limitation at issue in Flook). Indeed, perhaps this explains why Justice
Stevens was willing to join the expansive majority opinion in Chakrabarty, although he had
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The phrase "anything under the sun that is made by man" has been
much quoted in subsequent judicial decisions as supporting an expansive
interpretation of the scope of § 101. 120 But the expansive words "anything under the sun" are qualified by the restrictive condition "that is
made by man." For the Chakrabarty majority, this restrictive condition
captured the difference between Chakrabarty's microorganism and the
kinds of discoveries that had previously been excluded from patent
protection as "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas. " 121 The Court saw the same distinction lurking in the legislative
history of the Plant Patent Act:
Congress . . . recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature,
whether living or not, and human-made inventions. 122
Although the government never argued that Chakrabarty's organism
was a product of nature, Justice Burger nonetheless explained at some
length why it was not, suggesting that the government's concession on
this point made the outcome of the case a foregone conclusion. The very
first sentence of the opinion characterized the issue before the court as
"whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101." 123 Later, the majority emphatically
distinguished Chakrabarty's microorganism from the unpatentable discovery in Funk v. Kalo:
There, the patentee had discovered that there existed in nature
certain species of root-nodule bacteria which did not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other. He used that discovery to produce
a mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous
plants. . . . Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His
discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is
patentable subject matter under § 101. 124
opposed patent protection for computer-implemented inventions just two years earlier
when he authored the majority in Parker v. Flook and did so again one year later when he
authored the dissent in Diamond v. Diehr.
120 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred,
534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001); State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
121

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 44 7 U.S. at 309.

12 2

Id. at 313.

123

Id. at 305 (emphasis added).

124

Id. at 310.
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In other words, once it was conceded that the microorganism was not a
product of nature, the invention had passed the test of§ 101.

Beyond Chakrabarty
Although the Supreme Court recognized in Chakrabarty, as it had in
prior decisions, that Congress has the authority to set the rules for
determining what may be patented, Chakrabarty nonetheless seemed to
represent a shift in the default rules that apply in the face of Congressional inaction. 125 Whereas Flook, by denying protection, had placed the
burden of inertia on those who seek protection for new fields of technology to approach Congress, Chakrabarty, by granting protection, placed the
burden of inertia on those who opposed it. This shift has had a number
of important consequences.
First, it immediately stemmed the flow of cases involving the scope
of § 101 into the courts. The decision in Chakrabarty signaled to the
PTO that the Supreme Court was unlikely to back them up in future
disputes with the CCPA (and, later, the Federal Circuit) over interpretation of the scope of patent eligible subject matter. The PTO promptly
became less skeptical about the patent eligibility of new categories
subject matter, holding, for example, that plants 126 and animals 127 were
eligible for protection under§ 101 and thereby avoiding the occasion for
judicial review of the soundness of its § 101 rejections. When the PTO
rejects patent claims, applicants may appeal their decisions immediately,
but when the PTO allows claims, the courts have no occasion to consider
the correctness of the allowances until an infringement defendant challenges the validity of an issued patent. A defendant may avoid infringement liability by proving that a patent is invalid by clear and convincing
evidence, 128 and occasionally defendants have argued that an issued
patent is invalid under § 101. 129 But because infringement defendants
are typically commercial competitors of the plaintiffs who hold patents of
125 The Supreme Court had once before authorized protection, over a vigorous dissent,
for subject matter that Congress had thus far declined to protect in the case of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), affirming a lower court remedy
for common law "misappropriation" of news stories that the parties conceded could not be
protected under federal copyright law.
12 6 In re Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (ENA) 443 (Ed. Pat. App. & Int.1985) (reversing
examiner's rejection for lack of eligible subject matter of patent claims to seeds and plants
in reliance on Diamond v. Chakrabarty).
127 Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (ENA) 1425 (Ed. Pat. App. & Int. 1987) (reversing
examiner's rejection for lack of eligible subject matter of patent claims to oysters).
128 See

Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'!, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).

129 E.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred,
534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001).
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their own on similar subject matter, they are more likely to challenge the
patents on grounds that are specific to the particular patents in suit
(such as anticipation or obviousness in light of the prior art) rather than
on broader grounds (such as lack of patentable subject matter) that
might categorically invalidate the patents that they own along with the
patents that they are charged with infringing. Even when infringement
defendants are willing to challenge the patent eligibility of an invention,
the issue is unlikely to come before the courts in this context until years
after the patent was first issued. Meanwhile, as the PTO continues to
issue patents in a field, the expectation interest of firms in the continuing availability of patents for their inventions grows, making it harder
for courts to upset those interests by announcing a categorical exclusion
from patent eligibility.
Second, although the Court purported to address only a narrow
issue of statutory interpretation concerning whether Chakrabarty's microorganism was eligible for patent protection, it ultimately embraced a
very broad rule of patentability for "everything under the sun that is
made by man," leaving little room to distinguish Chakrabarty in subsequent cases. For this reason, Chakrabarty has become a standard citation for the patentability of subject matter ranging from computerimplemented algorithms 130 and business methods 131 to plants. 132 Those
who believe the patent system should exclude any categories of human
innovation from its reach have little hope of prevailing in the courts,
even if they get sued for patent infringement, 133 but must make their
case before Congress. The result has been a stunning expansion in the
kinds of innovations that are brought before the PTO, including new
sports moves, games, cooking recipes, and even the technology of legal
practice. 134
Third, the burden of persuading Congress to change the patent laws
has proven to be a heavy one, especially in industries where patent
holders have a strong interest in maintaining the status quo and are
thus well motivated to outmaneuver and outspend their anti-patent
adversaries. For example, although religious groups and others opposed
130 AT & T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 946 (1999).
13 1 State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
l:l2

J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001).

133

Those who wish to challenge the issuance of patents that they are not infringing
face the additional burden of persuading the courts that they have standing to litigate the
issue. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(dismissing challenge to issuance of patents on animals for lack of standing).
134 Recent examples may be found in ROBERT P. MERGES
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS at 206-08 (3d ed. 2002).
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to the patenting of animals as a matter of principle were able to get some
members of Congress to hold hearings on the topic, 135 they ultimately
failed to get any legislation passed. Opposition to patents on DNA
sequences has followed a similar course in the legislative arena. 136
In 1980, the Supreme Court assumed that Congress was "free to
amend§ 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced
by genetic engineering" or "to craft a statute specifically designed for
such living things." 137 Even at the time, such legislative action may have
been improbable. 138 Twenty-five years later, the only special rules that
Congress has enacted for biotechnology patents have been provisions
that the biotechnology industry has favored. 139

Conclusion
The decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty was
a watershed moment not just for the biotechnology industry, but also for
135 E.g., Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
136 E.g., Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intel!. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 1061h Cong. (2000).

On the other hand, the American Medical Association effectively lobbied Congress for
relief from remedies for infringement of patents on medical and surgical methods. P.L. No.
104-208, Div. A, Title I, § l0l(a), codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). For an account of the
legislative process by which this provision was enacted, see Chris J. Katopis, Patients v.
Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legislation, 71 ST JoHN's L. REV. 329, 331-38
(1997).
More recently, following the decision of the Federal Circuit to allow patents on
business methods in State St. Bank, Congress passed legislation protecting prior users of
subsequently patented business methods from infringement liability. P.L. No. 106-113,
Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273.
Neither of these legislative initiatives altered the range of subject matter eligible for
patent protection under § 101.
137

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318.

138 Today, it might well place the U.S. in violation of its treaty obligations. The GATTTRIPS agreement, to which the U.S. acceded in 1995, prohibits members from discriminating in the provision of patent protection on the basis of field of technology. In fact,
although the U.S. patent system generally applies a unitary set of rules to inventions in all
fields, the Patent Act has some field-specific provisions, some of which Congress has
enacted since the TRIPS agreement took effect.
139 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (permitting the patenting of a biotechnological process
using or resulting in a composition of matter that is novel and nonobvious, notwithstanding that the process might not otherwise be deemed nonobvious). See also, 35 U.S.C.
§ 27l(g) (defining as patent infringement the importation into the U.S. of a product made
abroad by a U.S.-patented process, a change in the law favored by the biotechnology
industry).
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the ongoing struggle between champions of an expansive patent system
on the CCPA and the skeptics on the Supreme Court. As predicted by
both proponents and opponents of patents on living organisms, investment in biotechnology R & D has flourished in the wake of Diamond v.
Chakrabarty. But the full consequences of the expansive approach to
patent eligibility endorsed by the Chakrabarty majority continue to be
felt far beyond the biotechnology industry. Five years after the departure
from the Supreme Court of Justice Douglas, the Chakrabarty decision
marked the beginning of the end of the Court's skeptical period. Thereafter, it would be up to the CCPA and the Federal Circuit, absent explicit
restrictions from Congress, to decide just how expansive the subject
matter boundaries of the patent system are. By the time of Judge Rich's
death nearly twenty years later, the Federal Circuit had not only
refrained from adopting new judge-made limitations on patent eligibility,
but had retreated from limitations announced in prior caselaw. 140 The
Supreme Court has not seen fit to reverse, and Congress has not seen fit
to intervene. A quarter century ago it was unclear whether the subject
matter boundaries of the patent system were expansive enough to
embrace biotechnology and information technology. Today, it is not clear
whether the patent system has any subject matter boundaries at all.

140 E.g., In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (overturning "printed matter"
rejection); State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (reversing holding of invalidity based on exclusions for mathematical algorithms and business methods); AT & T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999) (reversing holding of
invalidity based on exclusions of mathematical algorithms and intangible processes).

